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Delegation in a Cheap-Talk Game: A Voting
Example
1 Introduction
Suppose an agent is contemplating an action with state-contingent payoﬀs,
and has a prior belief about the probability of the states. She hires an
expert to update her priors before the action. Experts, it is known, may
be both informed as well as uninformed, and are not necessarily truthful.
The question asked in this paper is when, if at all, is it better for the agent
to assign the task of playing with experts and deciding on the action to
another agent with a diﬀerent set of priors. In particular, can an agent
increase her payoﬀ in a cheap-talk game by delegating to others to play the
game on her behalf? This paper shows that such proﬁtable delegation is
possible and characterizes the agents to whom a given agent may delegate
the responsibility.
While this generic problem can arise in many diﬀerent contexts, we have
chosen to model it in a simple voting situation where the electoral issue is
whether a certain policy with contingent outcomes should or should not be
implemented. Voters have diﬀerent priors about the probable states of the
world, and hence their expected pay-oﬀs from the policy vary. The elected
decision-maker can use the institution of an advisor before deciding whether
to implement the policy. We show that unless the median voter has very sure
beliefs about the probable states, she would be better oﬀ getting someone
else elected than herself as the decision-maker. In particular, if the median is
predisposed to (against) the policy action, she would be better oﬀ choosing
a candidate more (less) pro-action than herself. The optimal choice of the
decision-maker is shown to depend on the cost of misdirected policy, i.e. of
implementing it when it is actually unwarranted.
There are a number of recent papers contesting or reﬁning the standard
Downsian model, for example Harrington [3], Caillaud and Tirole [2], Mar-
tinelli [6], Martinelli and Matsui [7] and Schultz [10]. Though our voting
result can be counted as part of this family, its substantive query is diﬀer-
ent from the concern of the cited papers which explore the structure and
conduct of political parties and the political process. Our paper shares the
concerns of the literature on cheap-talk games with reputational concern.
The analysis of repeated cheap-talk games with reputational issues was ini-
tiated by Sobel [11] and explored further by B´ enabou and Laroque [1]. The
central concern of our paper belongs to this literature, though the game
analyzed here is a single-period game. Experts in our paper care to appear
knowledgeable so as to enhance the probability of getting rehired at the end
1of the period. An uninformed expert tries to masquerade as knowledgeable
to the decision-making agent by randomizing her advice according to the
decision-maker’s priors about the state of the world. Thus diﬀerent players
playing against an uninformed expert will face diﬀerent mixes of advice in
equilibrium. Some agents will be able to invoke an ‘informative’ equilibrium
even as other agents might fail, thus creating the possibility of delegation.
A second substantive issue of our paper relates to the question of per-
verse reputational incentives ﬁrst raised by H¨ olmstrom and Ricart i Costa
[5]. In Sobel [11] and B´ enabou and Laroque [1] ‘good’ experts are assumed
to always tell the truth. By contrast, in models where the behavior of ex-
perts is endogenized, there can be a perverse eﬀect of reputational concern.
Perverse eﬀect of reputation has been modelled in a variety of contexts.
Scharfstein and Stein [9] show that if managers have a reputational concern,
good managers have to sometimes say what is expected of them rather than
the truth. H¨ olmstrom [4] models how an employee’s concern for a future
career may inﬂuence his or her incentives to put in eﬀort or make deci-
sions on the job, creating both positive as well as adverse eﬀects. Morris
[8] models an informed expert who endogenously develops an ‘instrumental’
interest in appearing politically correct in repeated games, though she does
not have any direct concern for reputation. This instrumental concern for
reputation, too, leads to suppression of information. Perverse eﬀect of repu-
tational concern in these models generally leads to loss of information. Our
paper examines the possibility that some agents (and not others) are able
to invoke equilibria without information loss, despite endogenous expert be-
havior and their concern for reputation. The gain from delegation in our
paper arises from the fact that others may be able to realize an informative
equilibrium (deﬁned below) in the cheap talk game while the median voter
might not. The best delegate for the median voter among the agents who are
able to realize an informative equilibrium, is one whose subsequent choice
of policy using the information maximizes the median voter’s payoﬀ.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the overall model.
Section 3 deﬁnes and characterizes informative equilibria of the cheap-talk
game between an arbitrary pair of decision-maker and expert. Section 4
then uses these results to characterize the conditions for delegation and the
optimal choice of decision-maker by the median voter. Section 5 concludes
with a discussion of the crucial assumptions of the model and its robustness.
2 The Model
Voters have identical state-contingent payoﬀs from two alternative policies.
They however diﬀer in terms of their prior probability assessment about the
state of the world. In particular, we assume that there are two states 0 and
21 and two policies P0 and P1.
With the choice of P1, each voter’s payoﬀ is 1 if the state of the world is
1 while their payoﬀ is ¡¸, ¸ > 1 if the state is 0. With policy P0 in place,
the payoﬀ to a voter is the same in both states and we normalize this payoﬀ
to 0.
A representative voter has a prior probability p that the state is 1. Agents
diﬀer in terms of their initial priors and we assume that p is distributed over
the interval [0;1]. Agents will be referred to by their prior p. We denote the
prior probability assessment of the median voter by pM.
The vote is for choosing a decision maker (DM) who will be in charge of
implementing policy. We denote the decision maker by her prior assessment
pD. Before making the policy choice, DM however can consult an expert E.
The task of the expert is to gather information about the state of the world
and convey it to the decision maker. There are two types of experts. Type 1
experts can choose to receive a noisy signal s 2 fs0;s1g by incurring a small
cost c. The probability of getting the signal si when the state is i is given by
1 ¸ q > 1=2. These signals are thus informative of the state. Type 2 experts
referred to as uninformed experts do not receive any informative signals.1
We use pE to denote the prior of an expert that the state is 1. Finally let r
be the proportion of type I experts in the population, 0 < r < 1.
The sequence of events is as follows. First voters elect a decision maker
from among themselves. The decision maker then hires an expert from the
population of experts. DM’s prior belief about the probability that the hired
expert is a type 1 expert is r.
Now a cheap-talk game between the expert and the decision maker en-
sues. In this game, a chosen expert can send a message m. Before sending
a message, a type 1 expert may decide to incur the cost c and obtain a
signal. No such choices are available to an uninformed expert. The decision
maker does not observe whether the expert has received a signal. Without
loss of generality, we assume that a message m is restricted to the binary
set fm0;m1g. Upon receiving a message mj, the decision maker updates
her prior about the state of the world pD and the type of expert that she is
dealing with. Given these posteriors, DM chooses a policy. Voters’ payoﬀs
are then realized depending on the policy choice and the state of the world.
In the ﬁnal stage of the game, DM updates her belief to form the posterior
ˆ r that the expert is of type 1. This updating depends both on the message
m sent by the expert and the subsequent events. In case of the policy choice
P1, the actual state of the world is inferred accurately from voters’ payoﬀs,
and DM can use this knowledge to revise her belief on the type of the
expert. However no such knowledge is available if the choice was P0, and
1We can alternatively interpret such experts as those whose costs c of gathering infor-
mation are prohibitively high for them to ever become informed.
3the updating rule in this case can only condition on the original message
sent by the expert. Given this posterior assessment, DM then decides to
re-hire or ﬁre the expert. Re-hiring decision of DM follows a simple rule:
if ˆ r > r then the expert is rehired with probability 1, while if ˆ r < r the
expert is ﬁred with probability 1 . Finally, if ˆ r = r, DM rehires the expert
with probability ¼ where ¼ 2 [0;1] and is chosen by DM. The payoﬀ to the
expert is V >0 if she is rehired and zero otherwise. We assume that experts
care only about being re-hired and thus follow the objective of maximizing
the probability of getting re-hired.2 We assume as is standard in much of
the literature that the decision maker’s payoﬀ is identical to that of a voter
with identical prior.
3 The Equilibrium of the Cheap-Talk Game
In this section, we take a decision maker pD and an expert pE and charac-
terize the set of Bayesian-Nash equilibria of the cheap-talk game. It is well
known that cheap-talk games are typically characterized by a multiplicity
of equilibria. The same is true here as well. There are equilibria in this
game where all experts, irrespective of their types, would send the same
message. In that equilibrium the decision maker would choose the policy
that is optimal according to her initial prior pD. Subsequently her updated
prior on the expert would be r independent of the outcomes and she would
decide to keep the expert with any probability ¼ 2 [0;1]. There are also
equilibria depending on the value of pD, where, though both messages are
sent in equilibrium, DM always chooses the same policy. We are however in-
terested in equilibrium outcomes where both messages are sent with positive
probability, and DM’s choice of policy is inﬂuenced by the message received.
These constitute the only class of equilibria that is of interest since any other
equilibrium will not require the use of an expert’s advice. We will refer to
such an equilibrium as informative equilibrium.
Consider the following strategy proﬁle denoted as the (¤) strategy proﬁle.
Expert’s Strategy: Type 1 experts choose to receive a signal. If the signal
is si, they send the message mi with probability 1. Uninformed expert send
the signal m1 with probability t¤(pD) = 1¡pD(1¡q)¡q(1¡pD) and send
m0 with the remaining probability.
Decision Maker’s Strategy: The decision maker chooses Pi with prob-
ability 1 when she receives the message mi. Further if the message m0 is
sent, the expert is re-hired with probability ¼ = pE. With message m1 and
policy choice P1, the expert is rehired with probability 1 (resp. probability
0) if the state of the world turns out to be 1 (resp. state 0).
2Substantive results of the paper do not change if the expert’s payoﬀ also depends on
the choice of the policy. See section 5.
4Remark 1 Note that 1 ¡ pD(1 ¡ q) ¡ q(1 ¡ pD) is the probability DM
attaches to the event that an informed expert will send the message m1.
If and only if uninformed experts too send m1 with that probability, DM’s
posterior about the expert, ˆ r, can equal r upon receiving a message mi.
This explains why in the (¤) proﬁle, t¤ equals 1 ¡ pD(1 ¡ q) ¡ q(1 ¡ pD).
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium in which an expert of type 1 decides
to become informed, the equilibrium strategy proﬁle must coincide with the
(¤) proﬁle.
To prove this proposition we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In an equilibrium where a type 1 expert becomes informed,
her strategy must be what is described as Type 1 expert’s strategy in the
(¤) strategy proﬁle.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium where type 1 experts get informed. Let
¼i = ¼(P1;fig) be the probability that the expert is re-hired if policy P1
is chosen and the realized state is i. Denote by ¼0 the probability of re-
hiring if message m0 is received and policy P0 is chosen. Let k(si;mi) be
the probability that a type 1 expert sends the message mi when she receives
the signal si and let t be the probability that an uninformed expert sends
the message m1. The lemma is proved by ruling out the following three
contrary possibilities.
Possibility 1: k(si;mi) 2 (0;1) for i = 0;1.
In this case, an expert of type 1 randomizes over the messages for each
of the signal realizations. Let pE(si) be the posterior of the expert when she
receives signal si. Given s1, if the expert sends m1, her payoﬀ is pE(s1)¼1V +
(1 ¡ pE(s1))¼0V , while from sending m0 her payoﬀ is ¼0V . Thus for her to
randomize when the signal is s1, we must have
pE(s1)¼1 + (1 ¡ pE(s1))¼0 = ¼0
Similarly when she receives s0, if she has to randomize between the messages,
we must have
pE(s0)¼1 + (1 ¡ pE(s0))¼0 = ¼0
Since pE(s1) > pE(s0), the above equalities can hold only if ¼1 = ¼0 =
¼0. But in that case an expert of type 1 will be better oﬀ gathering no
information and sending messages with arbitrary probability. Hence case 1
can not occur if type 1 experts choose to be informed in equilibrium.
Possibility 2: k(s1;m1) = 1 and k(s0;m0) 2 (0;1).
In this case, an expert of type 1 randomizes over messages if her signal
is s0. Hence
pE(s0)[¼1 ¡ ¼0] + ¼0 = ¼0
5Since pE(s1) > pE(s0) and the expert who gets signal s1 always sends m1,
it must be that ¼1 ¸ ¼0. But if ¼1 = ¼0, then as in case 1, there is no gain
for a type 1 expert from being informed. Thus ¼1 > ¼0. Since pE > pE(s0),
we have pE[¼1 ¡ ¼0] + ¼0 > ¼0. Therefore an uninformed expert will prefer
to send the message m1 with probability 1. Hence in this equilibrium, m0 is
sent only by experts of type 1. But then DM’s posterior ˆ r that she faces an
expert of type 1 is 1 when she receives the message m0. Thus ¼0 = 1. But
then a type 1 expert can not send message m1 when she receives s0. Hence
case 2 can not occur either.
Possibility 3: k(m1;s1) 2 (0;1) and k(m0;s0) = 1
This case is analogous to the previous one. Since the expert randomizes
when she receives s1, we have
pE(s1)[¼1 ¡ ¼0] + ¼0 = ¼0
Since the expert with s0 always sends m0, we must have ¼1 ¸ ¼0. With
¼1 = ¼0, like earlier, there is no advantage of being informed. Hence ¼1 > ¼0.
Now if ¼0 > 0, then pE < pE(s1) implies that the uninformed type will send
the message m0 with probability 1. Since expert of type 1 sends message m0
with probability strictly less than 1, DM’s posterior that she faces a type
1 expert when she receives m0 must be strictly less than r. But then the
expert must be ﬁred, i.e, ¼0 = 0. With ¼0 = 0, the uninformed expert is
strictly better oﬀ sending only the message m1. But then we are back to the
situation in case 2 where the message m0 is sent only by type 1. It would
imply that DM must assign posterior probability 1 that she is facing a type
1 expert when she gets the message m0 and then ¼0 can not be zero.
Eliminating all the possibilities above we arrive at the result that in any
such equilibrium we must have k(m1;s1) = 1 = k(m0;s0). This proves the
lemma.
To prove proposition 1, we need two further notations. For any strat-
egy proﬁle for the experts where expert of type 1 plays by (¤) proﬁle and
the uninformed expert sends m1 with probability t, denote by r(mi;t) the
posterior of DM that she faces an informed expert when she receives mi.
Further let r(P1;t;i) denote the posterior of DM after the policy choice P1
and with the realization of the state i. Using Remark 1, one can easily check
the validity of the following observation.
Observation 1 For the (¤) strategy proﬁle
(a) r(m0;t) > r if and only if t > t¤ = 1 ¡ pD(1 ¡ q) ¡ q(1 ¡ pD)
(b) r(P1;t;0) > r implies t < t¤.
(c) r(P1;t;1) < r implies t > t¤.
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equilibrium a type 1 expert must play the strategy corresponding to the (¤)
proﬁle. We ﬁrst show that the strategy of the uninformed expert is to send
m1 with probability t¤. Let t be this probability. We show that if t is not
t¤, it leads to a contradiction.
Case 1: t > t¤
In this case by observation 1, part (a), r(m0;t) > r. Since DM chooses
policy P0 when the message is m0 and no further information is revealed
about the state of the world and thus of the type of the expert, DM must
rehire the expert with probability 1. This gives a payoﬀ of V to experts
sending m0. Now if m1 is sent, by observation 1,part (b), the posterior of
DM after the choice of P1 followed by the materialization of state 0 must be
less than r. Hence the expert will be ﬁred in that event. Hence the expected
payoﬀ to an uninformed expert from sending m1 can at most equal pEV < V .
This implies that an uninformed expert will be better oﬀ sending message
m1 with probability t = 0. Hence t can not be greater than t¤.
Case 2: t < t¤.
By part (a) of observation 1, the posterior of DM upon receiving m0
must be less than r and thus an expert will be ﬁred if she sends m0. The
payoﬀ to an expert sending message m0 is thus zero. Moreover since t < t¤,
by part (c) of observation 1, it follows that the posterior of DM if she chooses
P1 and observes state 1 is strictly greater than r. The expert in this case
will then be re-hired with probability 1. Thus the uninformed expert can
assure herself a payoﬀ of pEV by sending the message m1 with probability
1. Hence t can not be less than t¤.
We now consider the behavior of DM. Since the strategies of the experts
correspond to the (¤) strategy proﬁle, upon receiving the message mi, the
posterior of DM that she faces an informed expert is exactly equal to r. Since
choice of P0 does not lead to any further information, it is clearly optimal
for the DM to choose ¼ = pE. However after the choice of P1 (following the
message m1), DM’s posterior will be greater than r if and only if the state
realized is 1. Hence the strategy of DM in the (¤) proﬁle which calls for
rehiring the expert with probability 1 (resp. probability 0) after the choice
of P1 and the realization of the state 1 (resp. 0) is also optimal.
Does an informative equilibrium always exist? Not necessarily.
For any pD, deﬁne pD(mi) as the posterior of DM that the state is 1
when she receives the message mi given that the experts are playing by the
(¤) strategy. It is easy to check that
pD(m1) =
pD[rq + (1 ¡ r)t¤(pD)]
r[pDq + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ pD)] + (1 ¡ r)t¤(pD)
7pD(m0) =
pD[r(1 ¡ q) + (1 ¡ r)(1 ¡ t¤(pD))]
r[pD(1 ¡ q) + q(1 ¡ pD)) + (1 ¡ r)(1 ¡ t¤(pD))]
Also deﬁne
A(pD) = fpDjpD(m1)(1 + ¸) ¡ ¸ ¸ 0g
B(pD) = fpDjpD(m0)(1 + ¸) ¡ ¸ · 0g
The following observation will be useful for future reference.
Observation 2 There exists a non-empty set C = [p¤;p¤] ½ [0;1] such
that p 2 A(p) \ B(p) if and only if p 2 C.
Note that if the decision maker’s pD satisﬁes pD 2 A(pD) (resp. B(pD)),
then this decision maker will choose policy P1 (resp. P0) when she receives
m1 (resp. m0) if the experts play by the (¤) strategy proﬁle. We can now
state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Fix (pD;pE).
(a) If (¤) proﬁle is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium then we must have pD 2 C.
(b) For q > 1=2 and pD 2 C, there exists c suﬃciently small3 such that
(¤) proﬁle is indeed a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game between
(pD;pE).
Remark 2 It should be noted that the outcome in this informative equilib-
rium (when it exists) is completely independent of the prior pE of the expert
and depends only on the prior of the decision maker. The prior of the expert
is important only in determining whether the expert of type 1 will ﬁnd it in
her interest to become informed and thus in determining whether one ob-
tains an informative equilibrium in the cheap-talk game. In what follows we
assume the cost c to be suﬃciently small (close to zero) such that whenever
pD 2 C, an informative equilibrium is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 2 .
(a) Assume that the (¤) proﬁle is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk game.
If pD = 2 A(pD), then DM will not choose the policy P1 upon receiving the
message m1 and thus DM’s strategy will not correspond to the (¤) strategy
proﬁle, while if pD = 2 B(pD), DM will not choose P0 if she receives m0. Thus
for (¤) proﬁle to be an equilibrium we must have pD 2 A(pD) \ B(pD).
(b) Assume that the DM follows the strategy given by (¤) proﬁle. Con-
sider now the uninformed expert. If she sends in the message m1, policy P1
will be chosen. As she reckons, with probability pE the state will be 1 and
she will be retained with probability 1, while she will be ﬁred and get zero
3Possibly dependent on the value of pE
8with probability (1 ¡ pE). Thus her expected payoﬀ is pEV . By sending in
the message m0, she also nets pEV since following m0, the expert is re-hired
with probability pE. Thus the uninformed expert’s strategy is optimal.
Consider now an expert of type 1. If she does not collect any information,
her payoﬀ is exactly pEV . Now assume that she decides to receive signals.
Given si, let pE(si) be her posterior that the state is i. Since q > 1=2,
pE(s1) > pE > pE(s0). Thus the strategy of expert 1 in the (¤) proﬁle that
asks for sending mi with probability 1 on observing si is optimal. Expected
payoﬀ of the informed expert from obtaining information and playing (¤)
(exclusive of the cost) is
pE(qV + (1 ¡ q)pE:V ) + (1 ¡ pE)q:pE:V
Since this payoﬀ is strictly increasing in q and equals pEV at q = 1=2, the
result follows.
The proof that DM’s strategy is optimal follows exactly the same lines
as in the proof of Proposition 1.
One interesting implication of Proposition 2 is that if pD is too high (or
too low), then pD = 2 A(pD)\B(pD), consequently with such a representative,
there will be no role of an advisor since the cheap-talk game will not admit
of any informative equilibria. Such decision makers therefore never listen
to an advisor. A decision maker who makes use of an expert’s information
must necessarily be moderate in terms of her priors.
4 Who serves the median voter best?
Which decision maker will best represent the interests of the median voter?
Let us recall that a median voter is characterized by her prior pM. Let ˆ p
satisfy ˆ p(1+¸) = ¸. Clearly ˆ p is in C. Moreover p¤ < ˆ p < p¤. If an arbitrary
pD is chosen to implement policy on behalf of the median voter pM, then
the payoﬀs for the median voter are as follows.
Lemma 2 The payoﬀs to the median voter from a choice of pD are
given by
(a) 0 if pD < p¤,
(b) pm(1 + ¸) ¡ ¸ if pD > p¤,
(c) r[pmq ¡ (1 ¡ pm)(1 ¡ q)¸] + (1 ¡ r)t¤(pD)[pm(1 + ¸) ¡ ¸] otherwise:
The optimal choice of DM for the median voter directly follows from lemma
2 and is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let pD(pm) be the optimal choice of DM by the median
voter.
9(a) Suppose pm = 2 C then pD(pm) = pm.
(b) Suppose pm 2 C and pm < ˆ p, then pD(pm) = p¤
(c) Suppose pm 2 C with pm > ˆ p, then pD(pm) = p¤4
Part (a) of the proposition is trivial. The proof of the other two parts
follow from the following observations. If pm < ˆ p, then [pm(1+ ¸) ¡ ¸] < 0.
From lemma 2 (c), the median voter’s payoﬀ in this case would be higher if
t¤ is smaller. Since t¤ decreases with pD, p¤ maximizes the median’s payoﬀ.
On the other hand when pm > ˆ p, [pm(1+¸)¡¸] > 0 and thus the payoﬀ to
pM can be maximized by delegating to one with the highest pD in C.
5 Discussion
The model of this paper shows the possibility of delegation in cheap talk
games in general and can be used in various contexts. Here we will use
the voting example to elaborate on its interesting properties. suppose P0
represents the status quo which can be broken by the reform action P1.
Voters for whom p(1 + ¸) ¡ ¸ > 0 are those whose priors make them pro-
reform, and p(1 + ¸) ¡ ¸ < 0 are those against the reform. Proposition 3
suggests that if the median voter has strong beliefs (pm = 2 C), then there is
no scope for delegation. But if she is moderately pro-reform (pm 2 C), then
she would gain by electing an agent who is more pro-reform than herself.
Likewise if she is moderately anti-reform, she should elect one who is even
more oriented to status quo. In general, a moderate median should delegate
to candidates who have a stronger leaning for what she herself prefers. Note
however that it does not help to elect arbitrarily extreme candidates. If
pro-reform, the median’s choice is p¤, and if against, her choice is p¤. A
candidate more extreme than p¤ or p¤ would be able to get experts to play
their part of the (*) strategy, but will not be inﬂuenced by their signals.
Since they would not use the experts’ information, they would not improve
the median voter’s payoﬀ.
In the model ¸ represents the cost of a misdirected policy – of going for
the reform when it is actually unwarranted. How does the probability of
reform change with ¸? Note that Both p¤ and p¤ are increasing functions of
¸. Suppose pM was initially for reform, and subsequently the cost of making
the policy mistake increases, but it leaves the median still pro-reform. In the
new situation the median voter should choose a candidate who is even more
pro-reform than she should have chosen previously. On the other hand, if
pM was for status quo, then an increase in ¸ would bring the median’s choice
closer to herself.
4For pm = ˆ p, any choice of pD is an equilibrium choice.
10How robust are these results? First, our model assumes identical utility
functions for voters who diﬀer over their priors. With some change in the
structure, comparable results can be produced in a model where agents have
identical priors but vary in terms of utility functions.
Secondly, in our model the expert maximizes the chance of getting re-
hired, and does not care about the choice of policy. Would the results change
if she also had a stake in the policy choice? Suppose the expert’s payoﬀ is
¼V + w[pE(1 + ¸) ¡ ¸], where w is a positive constant. Clearly this would
not alter an informed expert’s strategy. Therefore the probability of sending
m1 by the uninformed expert, t¤(pD) = 1 ¡ pD(1 ¡ q) ¡ q(1 ¡ pD), would
not change either. It is only the probability of rehiring that would change in
equilibrium and therefore the payoﬀs of the experts. Thus the substantive
results will remain unchanged.
The results would be however dramatically altered if the decision-maker
herself becomes the expert. Suppose the decision-maker does not hire an
expert, and has a payoﬀ related to the probability of getting re-elected. In
that case the decision-maker can be seen as the expert while the median
voter decides on rehiring. From the model we have seen that the prior of
the expert does not play any role in equilibrium. This would imply that the
median voter would have no reason to choose a decision-maker with a prior
diﬀerent from pM.
Finally, in this model when P0 is chosen subsequent events do not pro-
duce any further information about the expert. This is a crucial assumption.
Suppose both policy choices would eventually lead to information about the
soundness of the expert’s advice. In that case there can not be an informa-
tive equilibrium.
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